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Lection -- Dulles 19. estimates were based on based on another article he Year. An expanded version will wrote for the Encyclopaedia be published in regular book of the regular based on our view. 19. Encyclopaedia be published in regular book of the regular book form in the form in the regular book all strateg.

ulles, former esCentral Intelligence Agency, day the U.S. Russia's milisaid Wednes**overestimated**

tary intentions in the 1950s and rumors of a missile and bomber "gap" were born.

Dulles denied in an article published Wednesday that such a gap ever existed between

DULLES the Soviet Union and the

U.S. He thus confirmed Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara's denial in 1962 of a "missile gap," which was one of the major Democratic charges against the Eisenhower administration during the 1960 presidential campaign.

Writing in the April issue of Harper's Magazine, Dulles said the CIA, responding to "great pressure" from the Defense Department, produced projected Soviet missile production figures on the basis of their known capabilities.

But the CIA could only make an educated guess, Dul-les said, of how fast the Rus-sians would produce missiles and homeoner. and bombers.

The answer, in retrospect, was that the Russians decided to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) at a slower, more orderly rate instead of rushing their awk-ward, early-model ICBMs to launching pads, Dulles said.

When evidence of this appeared, Dulles added, the CIA quickly lowered its estimates. The same was true of the appearance of this appearance of this appearance of this appearance of this appearance of the appearance of the appearance of this appearance of the appea parent Soviet decision in 1957, to limit heavy-bomber production drastically.

"In this case, it was possibly fortunate that we erred on the side of overestimating the opponent," Dulles wrote. "All of this intelligence spurred us to press forward with our own missile programs."

Dulles, who retired in 1962 after eight years as chief of

The CIA would be "lost in a forest of uncertainty" if it tried to forecast U.S. policy decisions in the future, Dulles said. Yet the CIA's experts are asked to predict the same decisions by other countries.

"Unfortunately, the intelligence process of making estimatés will never become

an exact science," Dulles said.

His magazine article, "The Craft of Intelligence," was

the CIA, said the agency's ear-Approved For Release 2000/05/24 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200090104-5